PG&E Allegedly Broke Laws before San Bruno Gas Line Explosion
Posted: 2012-1-22
After meeting in Washington, D.C., the National Transportation Safety Board has
determined that PG&E pipeline management practices and poor quality
maintenance work were the probable causes of the San Bruno, CA pipeline
explosion. The California PUC and federal regulators were also cited with part
of the blame, though the city of San Bruno was not cited as participatory in the
events that led to the accident.
The NTSB found the probable cause to be as follows:
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of the accident was the ) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in
1956 during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a
substandard and poorly welded pipe section with a visible seam weld flaw that,
over time grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture during a
pressure increase stemming from poorly planned electrical work at the Milpitas
Terminal; and (2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which
failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section.
Contributing to the accident were the CA PUC's and US DOT's exemptions of
existing pipelines from regulatory requirement for pressure testing, which likely
would have detected the installation defects. Also contributing to the accident
was the CA PUC's failure to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipline inetegrity
management program."
determined that PG&E pipeline management practices and poor quality
maintenance work were the probable causes of the San Bruno, CA pipeline
explosion. The California PUC and federal regulators were also cited with part
of the blame, though the city of San Bruno was not cited as participatory in the
events that led to the accident.
The NTSB found the probable cause to be as follows:
"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause
of the accident was the ) inadequate quality assurance and quality control in
1956 during its Line 132 relocation project, which allowed the installation of a
substandard and poorly welded pipe section with a visible seam weld flaw that,
over time grew to a critical size, causing the pipeline to rupture during a
pressure increase stemming from poorly planned electrical work at the Milpitas
Terminal; and (2) inadequate pipeline integrity management program, which
failed to detect and repair or remove the defective pipe section.
Contributing to the accident were the CA PUC's and US DOT's exemptions of
existing pipelines from regulatory requirement for pressure testing, which likely
would have detected the installation defects. Also contributing to the accident
was the CA PUC's failure to detect the inadequacies of PG&E's pipline inetegrity
management program."
